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1

JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review Orders of the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Were the April 27,1999, Order on Motion for Review in the BeH matter
and the August 11,1998, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Interim Order in the
Thomas matter final orders upon which an Abstract of Award could be issued?
Issue 2: Are interim orders awarding permanent total disability benefits pursuant to
§ 35-l-67(6)(a) in general final orders upon which an Abstract of Award can be issued
and from which an appeal may be taken?
Standard of Review: The Utah Supreme Court reviews for correctness giving no
deference to the Utah Court of Appeals. Grand County v. Rogers. 2002 UT 25,44 P.3d
734.
OPINIONS OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Copies of the Utah Court of Appeals decisions issued in these two cases can be
found in Addendums A and B of the Petitioners1 Joint Brief.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES,
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following statutes and rules, of which the full text, as needed, can be found in
Addendum C of Petitioners' Joint Brief, or Addendum A of this Brief, are determinative
in this appeal:
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Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-212 (1997)
(l)(a) An abstract of anyfinalorder providing an award may be filed under this
chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, in the office of the
clerk of the district court of any county in the state.
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-59 (1979)
An abstract of any award may be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court
of any county in the state . . .
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-67 (1995)
(6)(a) Afindingby the commission of permanent total disability is not final,
unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, until:
(i)

the commission reviews a summary of reemployment activities
undertaken pursuant to Chapter 10, Utah Injured Worker
Reemployment Act;

(ii)

the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the commission a
reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider
reasonably designed to return the employee to gainful employment or
the employer or its insurance carrier provides the commission notice
that the employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; and

(iii)

the commission, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless
otherwise stipulated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation
and to review any reemployment plan submitted by the employer or
its insurance carrier under Subsection (6)(a)(ii).

Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-10 (1988)
(1)

Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any posthearing papers permitted by the presiding officer, or within the time
required by any applicable statute or rule of the agency, the presiding
officer shall sign and issue an order that includes:
(e)

a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration;
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(f)
(g)

a notice of any right to administrative or judicial review of the order
available to aggrieved parties; and
the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review.

Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-12 (1998)
(6)

(a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other filings,
or oral argument, or within the time required by statute or applicable rules,
the agency or superior agency shall issue a written order on review.
(c)

The order on review shall contain:
(vii)

a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration
or judicial review available to aggrieved parties; and
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Bell:
1.

On July 20,1995, Claud Bell sustained a lower back injury by accident

arising out of and in the course of his employment with Harper Investments. (Bell Record
(hereinafter "BR") vol. 5 at 31).
2.

On July 22, 1996, Mr. Bell filed an Application for Hearing seeking

permanent total disability compensation and medical expenses. (BR vol.1 at 4-21.)
3.

On April 24, 1997, a hearing was held before the Labor Commission of

4.

On August 19,1998, the ALJ ruled Mr. Bell met the legal requirements for

Utah.

permanent total disability, that permanent total disability payments begin, and that the
employer/carrier pay Mr. Bell's medical expenses. (BR vol. 1 at 331).
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5.

On September 18, 1998, the employer/carrier submitted a Motion for

Review to the Labor Commission of Utah, requesting review of the ALJ's award of
permanent total disability compensation to Mr. Bell. (BR vol.2 at 342-553).
6.

Seven months later, on April 27, 1999, the Labor Commission tentatively

found permanent total disability on the part of Mr. Bell and ordered the employer/carrier
to pay compensation to Mr. Bell. (BR vol. 2 at 565-70). However, the Order on Motion
for Review remanded Mr. Bellfs case back to the ALJ for additional proceedings to
determine, in part: 1) Mr. Bell's need for pain medication; 2) the application of Rule 6122-26 to Mr. Bell's claim for medical expenses related to his 12/97 and 8/98 surgeries; 3) a
review of rehabilitation/reemployment activities; 4) resolution of an issue related to
attorneys fees; and 5) the location of the jobs offered in relationship to where Mr. Bell
worked. Finally, the Order directed the ALJ to make a "final determination" regarding
Mr. Bell's entitlement to permanent total disability benefits. (BR vol. 2 at 568-69).
7.

The employer/carrier's counsel wrote to the Commissioner to ask if the

Labor Commission's Order was a final order. (BR vol. 2 at 571). The Labor
Commission of Utah replied that the Order was not a final order subject to appeal. (BR
vol. 2 at 572).
8.

A second hearing was held before the Labor Commission on April 25,

9.

To date, no Order, Findings of Fact, or Conclusion of Law have been

2000.

entered pursuant to the April 2000 hearing.
4

10.

Despite the fact that no final order had been issued in the case, Judge

Donald L. George, an administrative law judge new to the case, entered an Abstract of
Award on May 5,2000. (BR vol. 3 at 844-45).
11.

Thereafter, on May 9, 2000, the employer/carrier moved the Commission to

set aside the Abstract of Award. (BR vol. 3 at 860-81).
12.

Before the Motion to Set Aside was decided at the Labor Commission of

Utah, Mr. Bell docketed the Abstract of Award in the Third District Court and began
execution proceedings against the employer.
13.

On June 5, 2000, respondents filed a Motion for Review of the Abstract of

Award. (BR vol. 3 at 896-905)
14.

On August 29, 2000, the Labor Commission denied the Motion for Review

of the Abstract. (BR vol. 3 at 985-89)
15.

The employer/carrier moved the district court to set aside the Abstract of

Award and the Order for Supplemental Proceedings. (BR vol. 3 at 992-98). The
employer/carrier's motion was denied by the district court on September 15,2000.
16.

The employer/carrier also filed a Petition for Stay with the Labor

Commission on September 1, 2000. (BR vol. 3 at 990-91). The Labor Commission,
however, denied the petition on the basis that the employer/carrier never sought judicial
review of the April 27, 1999, order. (BR vol. 3 at 1015-17).
17.

The employer/carrier filed for a stay at the district court pending appeal.

The district court granted the petition for stay.
5

18.

On March 28, 2001, respondents filed a Petition for Review of Agency

Action with the Utah Court of Appeals.
19.

On December 6, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for lack

of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals indicated that the Commission's April 27, 1999
Order was not a final Order. In a footnote, the Court indicated that the Abstract had been
issued improperly. Harper Investment Inc. v. Claud Bell. 2001 UT App 371.
Thomas:
1.

On October 15, 1994, Nellie Thomas, broke her left arm in the course and

scope of her employment with Color Country Management d.b.a. Sizzler. (Thomas
Record (hereinafter "TR") vol. 3 at 19-20).
2.

On May 19,1997, Ms. Thomas filed an Application for Hearing alleging

entitlement to permanent total disability. (TR vol. 1 at 7-26).
3.

On January 6, 1998, an administrative hearing was held before Judge Sims.

4.

On August 11,1998, Judge Sims entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions

of Law, and Interim Order tentatively finding Ms. Thomas permanently totally disabled
and ordering payment of subsistence benefits. (TRvol. 1 at 233-237).
5.

Ms. Thomas received continuing disability benefits through February 13,

1999. (TRvol. 2 at 512-28).
6.

A second hearing was held on March 8, 2000.

7.

On May 18,2000, Judge La Jeunesse issued an Abstract of Award based on

the August 11, 1998 Interim Order. (TR vol. 1 at 339-347).
6

8.

On June 14, 2000, Judge La Jeunesse issued his Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Order, wherein he concluded on a final basis that successful
rehabilitation of Ms. Thomas was not possible. (TR vol. 1 at 353-374).
9.

On June 16, 2000, the employer/carrier filed a Motion for Review regarding

the Abstract of Award. (TR vol. 2 at 375-390).
10.

On July 14,2000, the employer/carrier filed a Motion for Review of the

June 14, 2000 Order.
11.

On August 2,2000, enforcement proceedings were initiated because the

Abstract of Award was docketed in Third District Court.
12.

On September 1,2000, the employer/carrier filed a Petition to Stay the

Abstract of Award with the Labor Commission. (TR vol. 2 at 559-580). The Petition
was subsequently withdrawn on October 23,2000 after the Third District Court granted a
stay. (TR vol. 2 at 586-587).
13.

On October 31,2000, the Labor Commission entered its final Order

denying in part the employer/carrier's July 14, 2000 Motion for Review. (TR vol. 2 at
588-595).
14.

On November 29, 2000, the employer/carrier filed a Petition for Review

with the Court of Appeals.
15.

On January 22, 2001, the Labor Commission indicated it would not rule on

the June 16, 2000 Motion for Review regarding the Abstract of Award as it was moot
since the Third District Court had granted a stay on the Abstract of Award.
7

16.

On December 6, 2001, the Court of Appeals ruled, among other things, that

the tentative finding of permanent total disability was not a final order and, therefore, the
Abstract of Award had been improperly issued. Color Country v. Labor Commission.
2001 UTApp 370, UTJ44-47.
17.

The employer/carrier made payment to Ms. Thomas and counsel on March

27,2002 based on the Court of Appeals' decision and this courts subsequent denial of
certiorari.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals correctly held that tentative findings of permanent total
disability benefits are not final orders. Harper Investment. Inc. v. Claud BelL 2001 UT
App 371, and Color Country v. Labor Commission. 2001 UT App 370, 1fl[44-47.
Therefore, the Labor Commission improperly issued the Abstracts of Award because
there were no final orders as required by §34A-2-212 (1997).
The Orders in the present cases upon which the Abstracts were issued, were not
final because of the following:
•

The orders did not contain the mandatory appellate language required by
§§ 63-46b-10 and 12.

•

The orders were not final pursuant to Union Pacific, as review of the orders
would and has disrupted the adjudicative proceedings, and they were
preliminary in nature.
The orders did not comply with the plain language of §35-1-67(6), and
petitioners have failed to address this issue.

8

•

Finally, the Labor Commission admitted that the Orders upon which the
Abstracts of Award were issued were not final.

Petitioners have failed to identify any case law or statutory authority indicating that
the Court of Appeals in any way erred in determining thai tin- /< YI/WI \V limlnip:- »l
p n n u t i n i t loldl luiluhls \\"\

not (iihil .iiiil llu.

"lit1 Abstracts were improperly issued.

Nor have petitioners identified any case law where contrary rulings have been made. The
Court of Appeals has consistently and uniformly applied this Court's holding in Union
Pacific.
I liiiotfiiiihiti I v, Ilk" ("'Mini ol A|J|M.',IIV (kvi^iuh h.i1 inidnccl y ^

1-67 and its

successor § 34A-2-413 unworkable because an employer/carrier cannot appeal a tentative
award of permanent total disability, nor can an injured worker enforce such an award.
Therefore, this Court should 1) uphold the Court of Appeal's decision that the orders at
issue in the present cases wen. not final , ami "!} hold thai tentative findings ol iiciiiiaiii/iil
total disability benefits in general are final orders for purposes of an appeal and
enforcement after all appeals have been exhausted.
ARGUMENT
I. T H E T E N T A T I V E F I N D I N G S O F P E R M A N E N T T O T A L D I S A B I L I T Y A W A R D I N G
SUBSISTENCE BENEFITS WERE N O T FINAL ORDERS UPON W H I C H ABSTRACTS OF
A W A R D C O U L D B E ISSUED

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-212 (1997) provides that "an abstract of any final order
providing an award may be

filed

in the office of the clerk of the district court of any

county in the state." (Emphasis added). I his st; it til < ;: ex.} >licitlj cc mtemplates a final oi < ier,

9

final agency action, and exhaustion of administrative and appellate remedies before an
abstract can be issued. (Although petitioners cite Sheppick v. Albertsons. 922 P.2d 769
(Utah 1996), in support of their argument that tentative findings could be docketed in
district court and enforced, Sheppick was governed by the predecessor to § 34A-2-212,
§ 35-1-59 (1979), which did not require that awards for enforcement be final, and is,
therefore, inapplicable.)
A. There Were No Final Orders as the Orders Did Not Contain the Mandatory
Appellate Language.
In the cases at bar, there were no final orders at the time the Abstracts of Award
were issued. In Bell, the ALJ entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
for a tentativefindingof permanent total disability on August 19, 1998. (BR vol. 1 at
327-35). An Order on Motion for Review was issued on April 27, 1999. The Order on
Motion for Review did not contain the appellate language required by U.C.A. §63-46b12(6)(c). (BR vol. 2 at 565-70). As the Labor Commission confirmed in its May 25,
1999 letter, the Order on Motion for Review was not a final order. (BR vol. 2 at 572).
In Thomas, the ALJ entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for a
tentative finding of permanent total disability on August 11, 1998. (TR. vol. 1 at 233-37).
The Order was not a final order. It, as with the Bell Order, did not contain the standard
appellate admonition contained in all Labor Commission final orders as required by
statute. (See TR vol. 1 at 236). See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10 (6)(c)(vii) (1988).
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Both subsection 10 and 12 simply indicate that a final order must contain the
appellate language, or it is not a final order. In its Response brief before the Court of
Appeals in Thomas, the Labor Commission stated the Abstract of Award
improvidently due In Ilk lack ul apptllak lan^tagi* (Rrspondenl I abut I tnnmissionfs
Brief at 24-26). Color Country v. Labor Commission, 2001 UT App 370, f44. This
would apply equally to Bell.
B. The Orders Were Not Final Pursuant to Established Case Law.
In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000 I J I 10, 999 P 2d
17, this Court outlined a three-prong test to determine whether an agency action is final:
1. Has administrative decision making reached a stage where
judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process of
adjudication?;
2. Have rights or obligations been determined or will legal
consequences flow from the agency action?; and
3. Is the agency action, in whole or in part, not preliminary,
preparatory, procedural, or intermediate, with regard to
subsequent agency action?
Id at f 16. The employer/carrier admits that the second prong of this test has been met.
Howevei: , the OKIIM I wen: noi inul Ixvause flin did not liitcl lh< liist and Ihiicl prongs ol
the Union Pacific test.
1. Review of the Orders Disrupted Further Proceedings.
Judicial review after the orders did "disrupt the orderly process of adjudication" in
these case, lo appeal each ta^e after llii (iTitatiw; Imdin^ puts ivlidhililahon efforts and
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thus the second hearing, on hold as occurred in Bell (although a second hearing was held
on April 25, 2000, to date no final order has been issued). This creates a large time gap
between the date of the tentative finding and the date of the final appeal. During that time
the employee's medical condition could deteriorate, or improve, thus creating a need to
rework any reemployment plan and require additional time to implement the plan if the
appeal is unsuccessful.
2. The Orders Were Preliminary and Intermediate.
Because the first orders were tentative orders of permanent total disability, they
were preliminary and intermediate with regard to subsequent agency action. The
petitioners have conceded that additional proceedings are required. However, petitioners
err in stating that the additional proceedings will not affect the Commission's
determination, particularly in Bell.
In addition, Mr. Bell's case was remanded in part for a determination on whether
the jobs offered by his employer were reasonable, specifically whether Mr. Bell's narcotic
usage would interfere with the jobs and whether the jobs were in a proper location. (BR
vol. 2 at 565-70). (Petitioner overstates that the Order of Remand was only to determine
whether Mr. Bell could be reemployed.) If the Commission determines that the jobs were
appropriate, Mr. Bell will not have even met his so-called prima facie case of permanent
total disability as petitioners assert. Union Pacific. 2000 UT 40, f21, 999 P.2d at 22,
clearly states that orders remanding cases are not final as they are "preparatory,
procedural, or intermediate, with regard to subsequent agency action."
12

If the issues entitling petitioners to benefits have not been completely decided, any
order requiring payments would either be erroneous, or intermediate, not final. The issue
in this case is whether petitioners are permanently and totally disabled, and that issue is
not decided until the final 1 leai ii lg regai ciii ig tl :ie successfi ilness of the rehabilitation plan.
Because interim orders earn, be overturned by the final order, such interim orders,
including the ones in these cases, are not final.
C The Orders Were Not Final Pursuant to § 35-1-67
Utah Code Annotated § 35 1 6 7(6), TIC >w § 34A-2 41 3(6), ii n iicates thai •
(a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability
is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, until:
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of
reemployment activities . . . ;
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the
administrative law judge a reemployment plan
(iii) the administrative law judge . . . holds a hearing . . .
regarding rehabilitation....
(Emphasis added). However, in arguing that petitioners met their prima facie cases, they
ignore the plain language of the statute, which states tentative findings .
findings This ("enurl stated ' out pi imais exial in inlerpii'lnii? statutes is lo eive effect to
the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language

We need look beyond the

plain language only if we find some ambiguity." State v. Bums. 2000 UT 56,125, 4 P.3d
795. In this case, there is no ambiguity in the statute, nor have petitioners proffered
contrary interpi etatioi i.

'

v.

. .... 13

Thus, the Orders were not final because they did not contain the mandatory
appellate language, did not comply with the three prong test outlined in Union Pacific, did
not comply with the finality language in § 35-1-67, and to deem them final is contrary to
the Commission's own admissions. Because the Orders entering tentative findings of
permanent total disability were not final orders, the Abstracts of Award entered in these
cases did not comply with § 34A-2-212.
II. UNWORKABILITY OF THE STATUTE

Having said the above, and taking into consideration the entirety of the Court of
Appeals1 decision, with which respondents disagree, respondents agree with petitioners
that the Court of Appeals' decision has now made U.C.A. §35-1-67 and its successor,
§ 34A-2-413, unworkable.
Under the Court of Appeals1 ruling, an injured worker who is tentatively found
permanently and totally disabled cannot enforce such a finding as it is not a final award.
Thus, unless the employer/carrier voluntarily begins payment of subsistence benefits, the
award is of no use to the injured worker.
Likewise, an employer/carrier who disputes a tentative finding of permanent total
disability cannot appeal the decision. Instead the employer/carrier must make one of two
decisions. First, the employer/carrier can chose to implement a reemployment plan,
proceed with the second hearing, and appeal after a ruling at the second hearing.
However, the employer/carrier would technically be forced to make subsistence payments
as part of the reemployment plan. If not, the Labor Commission, pursuant to its and the
14

Coiii I o f Appeals 1 decision, would determine at the second hearing that the reemployment
plan was fatally flawed and find the injured worker to be permanently and totally
disabled. Color Country v. Labor Commission. 2 0 0 1 111 A p p < '<>, JJ j Therefore, even
if the employer/carriei prevailed on Ms appeal ot tin t e n u i i w liinlnifj in would I M \ T no
m e a n s of recouping the improperly paid subsistence benefits.
Second, the employer/carrier could determine not to implement a reemployment
plan and request a final order under § 35-1-67 (6)(c)(iii) to appeal the decision
immediately and stay payment of subsistence benefits I lov 'ever, if the eiiiplo) ei '"eai i iei
were to lose 01 i its appeal it w 01 lid ha v e then waived its statutory right to implement a
reemployment plan and any possibility of returning an injured worker to the workforce,
which is the underlying purpose of the bifurcated hearing process.
Based on the above complications created by the ',
respondents urj'e llu1 Suprniu • ouillo w Ink up!

**•

Appeals' decision,
-

•»•• M,.*l neither (.

:m

the present cases w a s a final Order, hold that tentative findings o f permanent total
disability, which contain the statutorily mandated appellate language and are not
remanded on key issues, are final orders for purposes o f appeal a n d enforcement once all
appeals have been exhausted

" >• ,;
CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals correctly held that tentative findings of permanent total
disability benefits are not final orders. Harper Investment Inc. v. Claud Bell. 2001 11T
App 3' 71, and Color Country v. Labor Commission, 2001 ! J I Vpp 3' 713 rherefi >re, tin ; •.

Labor Commission improperly issued the Abstracts of Award because there were no final
orders as required by §34A-2-212 (1997).
The Orders upon which the Abstracts were issued, were not final because the
orders did not contain the mandatory appellate language required by §§ 63-46b-10 and 12.
Moreover, the orders were not final pursuant to Union Pacific, as review of the orders
would and has disrupted the adjudicative proceedings, and they were preliminary in
nature. In addition, the orders did not comply with the plain language of §35-1-67(6), and
petitioners have failed to address this issue. Finally, the Labor Commission admitted that
the Orders upon which the Abstracts of Award were issued were not final.
Petitioners have failed to identify any case law or statutory authority indicating that
the Court of Appeals in any way erred in determining that the tentative findings of
permanent total disability were not final and, thus, the Abstracts were improperly issued.
Nor have petitioners identified any case law where contrary rulings have been made. The
Court of Appeals has consistently and uniformly applied this Court's holding in Union
Pacific.
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals1 decision has rendered § 35-1-67 and its
successor § 34A-2-413 unworkable because an employer/carrier cannot appeal a tentative
award of permanent total disability, nor can an injured worker enforce such an award.
Therefore, although this Court should uphold the Court of Appeal's decision in that the
orders at issue in the present cases were not final for nothing more than their lack of
mandatory appellate language, this Court should hold that tentative findings of permanent
16

inal orders for purposes of an appeal and
enforcement once all appeals have been exhausted..
DATED this

S

day of

^>^p"

., 2002.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, Mil I l\<
& NELSON

/CARRIE T. TAYLORSMARK R. SUMSION
Attorneys for Respondent-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of the foregoing
instrument were mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this S~~ day of
C/^fl
, 2002, to the following:

David Parker
11075 S. State St., Suite 13
Salt Lake City, Utah 84070
Virginius Dabney
1060 South Main Street #2
St. George, Utah 84770
Aaron Prisbrey
1071 East 100 South, D-3
St. George Utah 84770
Alan Hennebold
Labor Commission
P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615

Mark R. Sumsion
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Addendum A
Statutes

35-1-59

Docketing awards in district court - Enforcing judgment

An abstract of any award may be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court
of any county in the state, and must be docketed in the judgment docket of the district
court thereof. The time of the receipt of the abstract must be noted by him thereon and
entered in the docket. When so filed and docketed the award shall constitute a lien from
the time of such docketing upon the real property of the employer situated in the county,
for a period of eight years from the date of the award unless previously satisfied.
Execution may be issued thereon within the same time and in the same manner and with
the same effect as if said award were a judgment of the district court.
In cases where the employer was uninsured at the time of the injury, the county
attorney for the county in which the applicant of the employer resides, depending on the
district in which the final award is docketed, shall enforce the judgment when requested
by the industrial commission. Where the action to enforce a judgment is initiated by other
counsel, reasonable attorney's fees and court costs shall be allowed in addition to the
award.
(1979)
63-46b-10

Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings - Orders.

In formal adjudicative proceedings:
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any
post-hearing papers permitted by the presiding officer, or within the time required
by any applicable statute or rule of the agency, the presiding officer shall sign and
issue an order that includes:
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact based
exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings or on
facts officially noted;
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclusions of law;
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision;
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the agency;
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration;
(f) a notice of any right to administrative or judicial review of the
order available to aggrieved parties; and
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review.
(2) The presiding officer may use his experience, technical competence,
and specialized knowledge to evaluate the evidence.
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may be based solely on hearsay
evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(4) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from issuing
interim orders to:
(a) notify the parties of further hearings;

(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings on a portion of the issues
presented; or
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and efficient conduct of the
adjudicative proceeding.
(1988)
Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-12 (1998)
(1)
(a) If a state of the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative
proceeding to seek review of an order by the agency or by a superior agency, the
aggrieved party may file a written request for review within 20 days after the
issuance of the order with the person or entity designated for that purpose by the
statue or rule.
(b) The request shall:
(i) be signed by the party seeking review;
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested;
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and
(iv) be mailed to the presiding officer and to each party.
(2)
(a) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within
the time period provided by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may file a
response with the person designated by statute or rule to receive the response.
(b) The party who files a response under Subsection (2)(a) shall mail a copy
of the response to each of the parties and to the [residing officer.
(3) If a statute of the agency's rule require review of an order by the agency or a
superior agency, the agency or superior agency shall review the order within a reasonable
time or within the time required by statute or the agency's rules.
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by order or rule permit
the parties to file briefs or other documents, or to conduct oral argument.
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties.
(6)
(a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other filings,
or oral argument, or within the time required by statute or applicable rules, the agency or
superior agency shall issue a written order on review.
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or by a person
designated by the agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to each party.
(c) The order on review shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be
affirmed, reversed, or modified, and whether all or any portion of the
adjudicative proceedings is to be remanded;

(vii) a notice of anyrightof further administrative reconsideration
or judicial review available to aggrieved parties; and
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review.
(2001)

